The recent public admission by CIA Deputy Director Michael Ellis that the United States is conducting a “broader range of espionage” (New York Times), against China marks more than an unusual moment of intelligence transparency. It signals a deeper transformation in how Washington views its competition with Beijing. The CIA official made the remarks on September 8, 2026, during the Billington CyberSecurity Summit in Washington, D.C.

Washington’s increasingly open acknowledgement of espionage against China should not be dismissed as an unusual comment from an intelligence official. It is a window into a much larger transformation in American strategy. The United States is no longer viewing China principally as a military competitor. It is increasingly treating China’s economic, technological and industrial rise itself as a strategic challenge.

Espionage between major powers is hardly new. The United States spies on countries it considers competitors, just as other major powers conduct intelligence operations. What is unusual is the growing willingness of American officials to speak publicly about intelligence activities directed at Chinese companies, technological capabilities and economic sectors.

The message behind this new openness is difficult to miss: Washington wants to know where China is going technologically, how quickly it is getting there and where its emerging strengths could challenge American power. The transformation of national security into an economic concept is at the heart of the matter.

For decades, military superiority was the principal foundation of American global power. Today, that superiority increasingly depends on technologies developed in commercial environments. Artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, robotics, biotechnology, quantum computing, batteries, telecommunications and renewable energy are simultaneously economic and strategic assets.

This means that a Chinese company developing a powerful artificial intelligence system or an advanced semiconductor is no longer viewed in Washington merely as a commercial competitor. Its achievement can be interpreted as part of China’s national power.

That creates a powerful incentive for American intelligence agencies to monitor Chinese technological development. But there is a deeper question. Is Washington trying simply to protect itself from potential Chinese security threats, or is it also attempting to slow the rise of a technological competitor capable of challenging American economic leadership? The answer is more of the latter.

By Washington spying on China’s access to sophisticated computing capabilities demonstrates an attempt to influence the pace and direction of China’s technological development. That begins to look less like conventional defence policy and more like strategic economic competition.

The United States cannot easily manage to make China poor or economically weak. Such an objective is unrealistic and potentially damaging to American interests as well. China is deeply integrated into the global economy, is an enormous market and remains central to international manufacturing and supply chains.

The more plausible American objective is narrower but still consequential: prevent China from becoming dominant in the technologies that will determine future economic and geopolitical power. This is a strategy of relative advantage.

Washington does not necessarily need to stop China from advancing. It needs to ensure that China does not advance so rapidly that American technological leadership disappears. That distinction explains why artificial intelligence has become such an important battleground. AI is not merely another industry. Leadership in AI could affect military capabilities, scientific discovery, industrial productivity, financial systems, intelligence operations and national economic growth. Semiconductor technology is similarly foundational because advanced computing depends upon access to increasingly sophisticated chips.

Whoever controls these technologies will possess enormous strategic influence.

China’s rapid development in these areas therefore creates a dilemma for Washington. If the United States allows Chinese companies unrestricted access to advanced technology, China could potentially close the technological gap more rapidly. If Washington restricts that access, however, it risks accelerating China’s determination to develop indigenous alternatives. The latter process is already becoming part of the strategic competition.

American pressure can encourage China to invest more heavily in domestic semiconductors, artificial intelligence, research institutions and alternative supply chains. China can then portray American restrictions as evidence of seeking to prevent China from achieving technological independence. China has already built independent technological sphere capable of challenging American influence. For example the technological development of high speed trains in China, is far more advanced making America trail behind. 

This is why the public discussion of espionage matters. Intelligence gathering can provide Washington with knowledge about China’s research priorities, corporate relationships, technological breakthroughs, industrial weaknesses and strategic ambitions. But public acknowledgement also serves another purpose: signaling.

By openly discussing expanded intelligence operations, American officials can remind China that its technological development is being closely watched. It communicates that Washington intends to compete not only through tariffs, export restrictions and diplomatic alliances but also through intelligence and sabotage.

There is an important legal distinction here. Espionage is not automatically equivalent to an internationally unlawful act simply because it is conducted against another sovereign state. States have long engaged in intelligence collection. The more serious legal questions depend on the specific methods used and whether particular operations violate domestic or international law. The larger problem is political.

When economic competition is increasingly defined as national security, it  becomes harder to separate from geopolitical confrontation. Chinese technological success is viewed in Washington as a security threat, and the restrictions of Chinese goods on America market serves as an economic containment. The consequences could be profound.

The world economy could gradually divide into competing technological ecosystems. Countries may face pressure to choose between American and Chinese technology platforms. Businesses could be forced to redesign supply chains according to geopolitical rather than economic logic. Developing countries could find themselves caught between two competing centres of technological power.

The irony is that a strategy designed to preserve American leadership could ultimately accelerate the emergence of a more divided global economy. The more pressure Washington applies, the stronger the incentive for China to develop alternatives. In some areas, American restrictions could therefore produce precisely the opposite of their intended effect: they could encourage China to invest more aggressively in domestic innovation and reduce its dependence on Western technology.

Washington should recognize the difference between managing a legitimate security threat and attempting to preserve technological supremacy indefinitely.

China’s rise cannot realistically be reversed through intelligence operations, export controls or economic pressure alone. Its enormous population, industrial capacity, scientific base and growing technological capabilities give it substantial resources for continued development.

The fundamental question is therefore not whether the United States can prevent China from rising. It is whether Washington can accept a world in which American technological dominance is no longer uncontested. The increasingly public role of espionage suggests that Washington is preparing for precisely that contest.

Gerald Mbanda is a researcher and publisher on China-Africa Cooperation and development.